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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS
AND NOTES
Joel W. Townsend*
Admissibility in Evidence of Defendant's Refusal to Submit to Test
for Alcoholic Intoxication-In the case of State v. Nutt, 65 N.E. (2d)
675 (Ohio, 1946), in which the defendant was prosecuted for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, the Ohio Court of Appeals (Greene County) admitted in
evidence the testimony of a chief of police and a physician that the
accused refused to submit to a physical examination or furnish a
sample of urine. The court held that this evidence did not violate
the defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination,
that the evidence offered was not required to be given by the defendant himself, but was given by the chief of police and the
physician called by the police to make the examination of the defendant. The constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination
relates only to disclosure by utterance of the defendant himself.
The court further held that this failure to submit to the tests may
be considered by the court and jury and may be the subject of comment by the prosecution.
(For a complete discussion of the aspects of this problem as to
compulsory tests for alcoholic intoxication and the desirability and
constitutionality of provisions relating to compulsory testing, under the authority of the police power of the state to regulate the
use of highways for the protection of the public, see: Mamet, B. M.,
Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to Determine Alcoholic Intoxication, 36 Jour. Crim. Law & Criminology 132-147
(1945).
Is a Person Entitled to the Return of His Fingerprints and Photographs
After His Acquittal on a Misdemeanor Charge?-An interesting decision with regard to the return of fingerprints and photographs
to a person acquitted of a misdemeanor charge was rendered recently by the Supreme Court of Indiana in State ex rel. Mavity v.
Tyndall et al., 66 N.E. (2d) 755 (1946). In substance, the court
said that the actual taking of fingerprints under ordinary circumstances is not an indignity, and in this case there was no valid
reason for their surrender or destruction by the police. It is not
for the court to make the decision if any of the records are to be
returned or destroyed, as in the absence of a statute, discretion
in the matter belongs to the police to decide whose identification
papers will be apt to assist them in the performance of their duty.
However, the court held that even though the police could retain
the acquitted person's prints and photographs, such a person is
entitled to an injunction against the exhibition of his photograph
in the "rogues gallery," as a violation of his right of privacy.
(A future issue of this Journal will carry a more complete and
annotated discussion on this case).
Blood Grouping Tess-Self-lncrimination-Admissiility in Evidence
of Blood Grouping Test Results Showing That Blood of Prosecuting
Witness Was of Same Type as Blood on Overcoat of Defendant-Upon
the arrest of the defendant in Shanks v. State, 45 A. (2d) 85
(Md., 1945), for the crime of rape, the police found blood
on his clothing, which he said was the blood of a certain person with whom he had a fight. Blood grouping tests showed how* Junior Law Student, Northwestern University, School of Law.
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ever, that the blood on the defendant's clothing was of a type
(type 0) different from that of the named combatant's blood (type
A). However, the tests did show that the blood on the defendant's
clothing was of the same type as that of the rape victim's (type 0).
Expert testimony, regarding the results of the blood grouping tests,
was admitted over the defendant's objection that the evidence was
self-incriminating, prejudicial, remote and valueless. Upon this
and other corroborating evidence, the defendant was found guilty
by the court, sitting without a jury, and sentenced to be hanged.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in affirming the defendant's
conviction, briefly dismissed the defense of self-incrimination, for
the reasons that the blood was taken from this coat rather than from
him, that the experiments and comparisons were made outside of
court, and the evidence came from the lips of witnesses other than
the defendant. The court also readily -held that it was competent
for the State to offer evidence to disprove that part of the defendant's explanation that the blood on his coat came from a third person, by showing that the tests proved that the blood could not have
come from that person, on the legal theory that a false statement
by the accused to a material circumstance may be considered
against him because such falsity tends to show guilt.
A much more troublesome problem was involved, however, as regards the defense that the evidence of similarity in blood type between the blood on defendant's clothing and the victim's blood was
too remote and valueless, in that it only showed that the blood on
the coat of the defendant could have come from the victim and that
45% of all the population have this blood type (0). In disposing
of this issue, the court said that blood types are now matters of
common or ordinary knowledge, that even if they were not, it is
adequate to explain to the judge and jury that 45% of the population have "0" type blood, and it could not be assumed that such
an explanation would be disregarded and not given its proper
weight; in other words, the objection of remoteness goes to the
weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. The court
further held that there is no analogy to bastardy cases where blood
tests are used only to disprove paternity by establishing definite
exclusion, as provided by statute; because in those cases the courts
and legislatures are then dealing with a situation where self-incrimination is involved, as blood must be taken from the accused to
make such tests, and where the nonscientific evidence is often quite
unreliable and scientific evidence may be conclusive only as to nonpaternity.
(Although blood grouping tests are generally held admissible,
previous cases and authorities in the field have expressed the view
that the results of such tests should be used only when they definitely establish a fact, i.e., that the accused could not possibly be
the parent, or that the blood on defendant's clothes is not the blood
of a certain person. It should be noted, however, that in the instant
case the evidence of similarity of blood type was coupled with the
evidence excluding the source alleged by the defendant.)
(For. a further discussion of the aspects of this problem, see:
Muehlberger, C. W. and Inbau, F. E., "The Scientific and Legal
Application of Blood Grouping Tests," 27 Crim. Law & Criminology
578-579 (1936)).
(A future issue of this Journal will carry a more complete and
annotated discussion of this case.)

